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CHAPTER 18 
Commercial Law 
KENNETH B. HUGHES 
§18.1. General. During the 1957 SURVEY year the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court has not been required to pass upon any particularly 
difficult questions in the field of commercial law. The cases sur-
veyed represent no legal developments along unfamiliar lines. The 
decisions, with two exceptions,l appear to be logical extensions of 
positions previously taken by the Court in dealing with similar 
problems. To the extent that one agrees with the solutions provided 
in those earlier cases the current dispositions by the Court will arouse 
no controversy. 
This relative lack of legal grist in the commercial law area at the 
appellate level may be difficult to rationalize with the claimed need 
for the wholesale repeal of our existing law on the subject and the 
enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code. Discussion of that 
compendious statute is reserved to some of those who are its pro-
ponents in other chapters in this volume. In the discussion of certain 
of the cases which follow, however, predictions will be hazarded as to 
whether the result reached by the Court would vary if the Code 
rule were applied to the same fact situation. 
This kind of inquiry will become increasingly important to the 
practicing bar as the new Code is faced with proving its justification 
in the problem-solving area. Although "uniformity" is the claimed 
desideratum in the commercial law field (and the hypnotic quality of 
the term is conceded) the Massachusetts bar is certain to be faced 
for the predictable future with a constant consideration of the extent 
to which Massachusetts has achieved internal and external non-uni-
formity, both with its own past decisions and with the views of those 
other jurisdictions which have received the respectful attention of 
our courts. 
§ 18.2. Acceleration clause in mortgage: Future interest. The case 
of A-Z Servicenter, Inc. v. Segall 1 raises the legal problem of whether, 
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§18.1. 1 The National Cash Register Co. v. Warner, 1957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 597. 
142 N.E.2d 584; Polonsky v. Union Federal Savings and Loan Assn., 334 Mass. 697. 
138 N.E.2d 115 (1956). 
§18.2. 13M Mass. 672. 138 N.E.2d 266 (1956). 
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when a mortgage note is given for a fixed sum representing both prin-
cipal and interest for the period of the note, the clause accelerating 
the maturity of the debt in event of default will be enforced as to 
future interest. The plaintiff-mortgagor sought a determination of 
the amount due on the mortgage and for an order of discharge and 
cancellation on payment of such amount. The mortgage note was 
given for the purchase price of $20,000 for realty and stated that 
$41,400, comprising principal and interest, was to be paid monthly 
over a period of fifteen years, and that in event of default the holder 
of the note had the option to declare the entire amount of $41,400 
due and payable, less any payments made thereon, as liquidated 
damages and not as a penalty. 
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial court's determination 
that the acceleration provision of the note constituted a penalty and 
was not enforceable as to future interest. The Court rejected both 
the language of the note and the mortgagee's contention that the future 
unearned interest was a part of the stated monetary obligation of 
the mortgagor and was properly recoverable as stated liquidated dam-
ages. The Court applied the settled rule that a contract designation 
of damages as "liquidated" is not decisive when, as in this case, actual 
damages for the breach are easily ascertainable and the stipulated sum 
is grossly disproportionate to actual damages.2 The decision in this 
case does not change the legality and binding effect of an acceleration 
clause which, at the option of the holder, advances the maturity of 
principal and interest actually due at the time of breach.s 
§18.3. Bank books: Exculpatory provisions. The nature of the 
relations between a savings bank and its depositor was involved in 
Polonsky v. Union Federal Savings and Loan Assn.1 The critical issue 
in the case was whether the defendant bank, which had paid out funds 
to a person wrongfully in possession of plaintiff's bank book, was ab-
solved from liability by an exculpatory clause printed on the inside 
of the bank book cover. The clause read: "This Association shall not 
be held responsible for money paid out to any person unlawfully 
presenting this book." 
The evidence established that the plaintiff's husband had opened 
this savings account by a transfer of funds to himself and the plaintiff 
as joint tenants. The bank book was handed to the husband by the 
teller without any mention of the limitation of liability provision 
printed therein. The signature cards signed by the depositors, the 
certificate of membership in the savings association and its by-laws 
2 Commissioner of Insurance v. Massachusetts Accident Co., 310 Mass. 769, 39 
N.E.2d 759 (1942). 
S Charlestown Five Cents Savings Bank v. Zeff, 275 Mass. 408, 176 N.E. 191 
(1931). 
§18.3. 1334 Mass. 697, 138 N.E.2d 115 (1956). See further comment on this 
case in §§5.2 and 14.5 supra. 
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did not contain any reference to the bank's nonresponsibility for 
payment to an unauthorized person. The trial court further found 
that there was no evidence that any of the printed matter contained 
in the bank book ever came or was brought to the attention of the 
plaintiff or her husband. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, reversing the trial court, held that 
the depositor is bound by lawful provisions printed in a bank book 
even though he has not read them nor had them brought to his at-
tention. The Court stressed that it is a matter of common knowledge 
that bank books frequently contain provisions defining rights between 
the bank and its depositors and that it is not unreasonable to treat 
such provisions as part of the contract between the parties. Spe-
cifically, the bank was deemed protected against unauthorized payment 
through operation of the exculpating clause when the bank used 
reasonable care and acted in good faith. 
Lacking Massachusetts precedent on the precise issue of this case, 
the Court found support for its decision in cases decided by the courts 
of certain other states, including New York, Ohio and Vermont. It 
rejected contrary views followed by California, Georgia and Michigan. 
In thus adopting what the Supreme Judicial Court is pleased to term 
the "prevailing view" and the "weight of authority" on this issue, 
there remains the troubling fact that in every previous Massachusetts 
case wherein a depositor has been held bound by a rule or by-law 
printed in a bank book, it appears that the depositor had signed an 
instrument by which he expressly agreed to be bound by the rules 
or by-laws of the bank.2 
The practical effect of the Polonsky decision is to impose upon the 
depositor of a bank, without his prior assent or notice, the obligation 
of doing business with the bank on terms of a wide variety of fine-
print provisions tucked away in pass books, deposit slips or signature 
cards, or in generalized references-over to unstated bank rules and 
by-laws. 
There are more forthright approaches to the central problem of 
arriving at the terms of the contract between a bank and its depositors 
than by this suspiciously indirect and unsatisfactory process. This 
would appear particularly true when, as in the present case, an ex-
culpatory clause by its own terms imposed no limits upon the circum-
stances wherein the clause would be operative. The clause purported 
to relieve the bank of all liability under all circumstances for its pay-
ment to an unauthorized person; the Court-imposed limitation of 
"reasonable care and good faith" does not reduce the impression that 
this clause, even so limited, was indeed a trap for the unwary. 
Application of Section 4-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
would probably produce the same result as that reached in the 
Polonsky case. 
2 Tapper v. Boston Penny Savings Bank, 294 Mass. 335, 2 N.E.2d 198 (19!!/S); 
Wasilauskas v. Brookline Savings Bank, 259 Mass. 215, 156 N.E. 34 (1927). 
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§18.4. Conditional sales: Good faith purchaser. The Budget 
Plan, Inc. v. Orr, Inc.1 marks the latest in a line of opinions 2 by the 
Supreme Judicial Court wherein the forward good faith purchaser 
of goods from a defaulting conditional vendee has prevailed against 
the claimed reserved security title interest of the original vendor. 
All of these cases turn upon the issue of whether a purported con-
ditional sale is not in fact a sale without reservation of title interest 
by reason of a claimed noncompliance with statutory requirements 
which govern conditional sales of personal property. 
The present case was complicated by additional problems in the 
conflict of laws area. The plaintiff brought this replevin action to 
recover an automobile in the possession of the defendant. The plain-
tiff had sold and delivered the car to one Smith at the plaintiff's place 
of business in Connecticut, under an alleged conditional sales contract 
by the terms of which title was to remain in the vendor until all 
payments under the contract were made. The plaintiff knew that 
Smith was a resident of Massachusetts and that the car would be 
brought immediately into this Commonwealth. Ten months after 
the date of sale Smith defaulted in his payments, owing about $1800 
under the contract. Four months before this default Smith had resold 
the car to a Massachusetts used car dealer and by subsequent sales 
it had come into possession of the defendant who had purchased with-
out notice of plaintiff's claimed title interest in the car. 
The Court first disposed of the question of whether Massachusetts 
or Connecticut law would be applied to test the validity of the con-
ditional features of the contract. It was held that Connecticut law 
applied and that plaintiff's failure to comply with the requirements 
of that law was fatal to the attempted reservation of a title interest 
as against the defendant, a bona fide purchaser. 
The pertinent Connecticut statutes 3 provide that all conditional 
sales contracts "shall be acknowledged before some competent authority 
and filed within a reasonable time in the town clerk's office in the 
town where the vendee resides," and further, that sales not made in 
conformity with these provisions "shall be held to be absolute sales 
except as between vendor and vendee." 
The contract herein was neither acknowledged nor filed, either in 
Connecticut or Massachusetts, the plaintiff contending that this 
recordation statute was intended for the protection of Connecticut 
residents only, as evidenced by the place of filing requirement. The 
Court rejected this contention but did not pass upon the question 
of whether in view of the vendee's Massachusetts residence the filing 
requirement was waived. The Court did hold that the statutory 
§ 18.4. 1334 Mass. 599, 137 N.E.2d 918 (1956). 
2 Nickerson v. Zeoli, 332 Mass. 738, 127 N.E.2d 779 (1955), noted in 1955 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law §7.3; Clark v. A & J Transportation Co., 330 Mass. 327, 113 N.E.2d 
228 (1953); Hurwitz v. Carpenzano, 329 Mass. 702, llO N.E.2d 367 (1953); Mogul v. 
Boston Acceptance Co., 328 Mass. 424, 104 N.E.2d 427 (1952). 
3 Conn. Gen. Stat., c. 310, §§6692, 6694 (1949). 
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requirement for acknowledgment was separable from the act of filing 
and that failure to comply with that provision alone was fatal to the 
plaintiff's security interest. 
The Connecticut cases 4 cited in support of this disjunctive reading 
of the acknowledgment and filing requirements of the statute seem 
equally in point when the plaintiff refers to the same case authority 
to support his view that acknowledgment and filing are inseparable 
parts of a single recordation process. Without benefit of legislative 
history the Court could reasonably conclude, as it did, that acknowl-
edgment of conditional sales contracts under Connecticut law was 
not a mere formality incident to filing but was an independent, addi-
tional protection for the conditional vendee by providing formal 
identification of the person who is to be bound on the instrument to 
which his signature appears. 
This is the type of case which indicates the need of a sensible plan 
for the title registration of motor vehicles, with a state-issued docu-
ment of title upon which all interests will be noted and with no 
transfer possible without endorsement and delivery of the title certifi-
cate. When an automobile is sold under a conditional sales contract 
the document of title would be retained by the vendor until the 
contract obligations of the vendee had been discharged. The need for 
such legislation will be rendered critical in the face of the apparently 
unlimited protection which the Uniform Commercial Code affords 
the bona fide repurchaser of "consumer" goods.5 
§18.5. Conditional sales contract terms: Defaulting vendee's lia-
bility for repossession expenses. Successive attempts to extend by 
terms of conditional sales contracts the defaulting conditional vendee's 
obligation for expenses incident to repossession and sale of the chattel 
have been struck down by Massachusetts courts 1 as violative of the 
language and legislative intent of the protective provisions of G.L., 
c. 255, §13A. But in the case of National Cash Register Co. v. 
Warner)2 the Supreme Judicial Court held that a contract provision 
calling for the specific inclusion of "attorney's fees and court costs" 
as charges against the conditional vendee's interest on repossession 
and sale did not have the effect of invalidating the security title of the 
vendor. 
The Court decided that the conditional character of the original 
transaction was not destroyed by the contract provision. It viewed 
the terms as meaning "reasonable" attorney's fees and statutory court 
4 Commercial Credit Corp. v. Carlson, 114 Conn. 514, 159 Atl. 352 (1932); Ameri-
can Clay Machinery Co. v. New England Brick Co., 87 Conn. 369, 87 Atl. 731 (1913). 
5 UCC §9-307(2). 
§18-5. 1 Nickerson v. Zeoli, 332 Mass. 738, 127 N.E.2d 779 (1955) (removal and 
storage); Clark & White, Inc. v. Fitzgerald, 332 Mass. 603, 127 N.E.2d 172 (1955) 
(storage); Clark v. A & J Transportation Co., 330 Mass. 327, 113 N.E.2d 228 (1953) 
(repairing); Mogul v. Boston Acceptance Co., 328 Mass. 424, 104 N.E.2d 427 (1952) 
(repairing). This problem is also discussed in 1955 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §7.3. 
21957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 597, 142 N.E.2d 584. 
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costs and held that these charges are an inherent expense in proceed-
ings for repossession and sale and clearly within the contemplation 
of the statute. The decision distinguishes these deductions from those 
which have been invalidated in past cases. The element of vagueness 
held to attach to earlier provisions for costs of "repairing" or for 
"storage" or for "removal and storage" was not deemed a factor in 
either attorney's fees or court costs, since the Court will control the 
reasonableness of the former and the latter are set by statute. Further, 
the use of legal process in repossession and sale is favored by law 
and must be used in all cases in which repossession cannot be effected 
without breach of the peace .• 
The protection afforded the security interest of the conditional 
vendor in this case against claimed invalidity of the security interest 
raised by an assignee for benefit of creditors of the defaulting vendee 
seems thoroughly justified. The decision removes the confusion 
created by language of the Court in the Clark case' wherein it was 
intimated that the only attorney's fees recoverable in a Section 13A 
situation were those incident to an action to collect a deficiency 
previously established against the defaulting vendee. The National 
Cash Register decision permits assessment of reasonable fees and court 
costs in establishing the amount of the deficiency or overplus, by 
provision therefor in the conditional sales contract. 
Similar reasoning should validate conditional sales contract pro-
visions for reasonable storage and similar expenses incurred as a neces-
sary incident to repossession and sale. The Court is equally as well 
equipped to apply "established legal principles" to such charges to 
refute the claim of vagueness and overreaching as it is to supervise 
the reasonableness of attorney's fees charged in a given case. While 
Section 13A now stands repealed by adoption of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, the Court will still be faced with the problem of pro-
tecting the unwary conditional vendee against contractual provisions 
for deductions which are vague as to amount and not necessarily 
reasonable or fairly incidental to the process of repossession and sale. 
At the same time, the conditional vendor should have maximum as-
surance that an overly legalistic approach to the problem does not 
result in conferring unwarranted windfalls upon devious debtors or 
creditors of bankrupts. 
3 G.L .• c. 255. §13E. 
'Clark v. A & ] Transportation Co .• 330 Mass. 327, 330, 113 N.E.2d 228, 230-231 
(1953). 
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